A lot of people here have mentioned veCRV.
PieDAO has recently launched its own version of veCRV that have some slight difference that may better serve YFI holders.
Staking power does not decay, so there is no compulsive lock extension. Staking power is scaled by time staked, so longer commitments increase staking benefits. You can stake multiple lots at different lengths. I find this is beneficial because it does provides a cleaner way to eventually exit if you so choose without years of progressively decaying ability.
CRV locks have become largely dominated by DAO’s over users because DAO’s have benefit of passing on boost. Here, we don’t exactly have a boost, as we don’t have a token to distribute as incentive. However we could possibly add an incentive here a la staking module plays.
Insurance is a big thing. It was mentioned earlier that YFI’s use of debt against YFI to repay the loss of hack worked out well and was repaid from protocol fees. Perhaps we can leverage the staked YFI in a boost style manner by allowing users to point their YFI as available collateral to back particular vaults. Instead of boost %, you have insured % of deposit, which is not tried yet afaik.
I can imagine a world where certain tokens pay bribes for protocol insurance. If needed, insurance would borrow against veYFI who’s insurance weight is pointed towards that vault. This debt would have priority to be repaid over time from protocol fees.
On this note, it could be very interesting to pass through debt for stakers, by fascilitating borrowing against their veYFI as a proxy for borrowing against underlying YFI. This should reduce the users vote weight proportionally to debt drawn, but not change the boost from time locked. A user can only point unused collateral as insurance backing, and perhaps an loss event may trigger liquidation if big enough vs insured portion.
Alternatively could just use boost as reduction in performance fee, which could create reduction in performance fee as a service dapps, but that would compete or possibly replace the share of performance fee given to partner dapps which direct liquidity.
Perhaps also, the use of KPI options to encourage early stakers. Doesn’t have to be too large.