Perhaps this entire thread needs to be reiterated.
First off, CEX are not smart contracts, there is zero audit-ability, and users deposits WILL be used to divert governance rewards to the CEX themselves, period. There is no benefit to allowing CEX participation using funds intended for trading (no user intended delegation by depositing), this can only be remedied via international court imo.
Either you have a snapshot mechanism, which by definition lends itself to funds being shuffled in order to vote in the snapshot, or a vesting mechanism which requires locked funds and guarantees legitimacy.
If smart contracts are allowed to vote via a snapshot, then vesting comes with an opportunity cost. So the real discussion is around how to implement snapshot voting via contracts with the understanding that flash loans open an attack vector to divert gov rewards within one block.
No user has intentionally delegated governance via lending yfi under a vesting regime. If there is a technical implementation that prevents entities like AAVE from diverting gov rewards, then that is the solution. If there isnt one, then the snapshot idea is flawed.
There is no basis of reasoning behind delegation, because no user has ever delegated yfi before. CEX involvement is truly unacceptable regardless of implementation.