@zirs3d thanks for setting out the proposal & some thoughts around it.
The concern: Lack of voter turnout, leading to lack of quorum on proposals calling for a vote. For a proposal to pass (either for/against), quorum must be met. Not enough holders are voting as measured by staked yGov.
The (hypothesized) sources of the issue (and how they could be solved):
- Individual voters with smaller staked yGov feel that their voting “voice” will not count against other voters with larger staked yGov.
In the conventional (non-crypto) space, this does not exist in a legal sense as most democracies are a 1-person, 1-vote system. The closest fix is to cap amount of staked yGov that would count for a particular address.
- Voters do not feel strongly about an issue enough to vote, or they do not have any information to feel they can make an informed vote. This could be lack of information about the poll itself.
In the conventional (non-crypto) space world, this is fixed by:
2.1. Having a longer time period for a proposal to be considered. This is like the reading of bills in parliament or senate. This allows sufficient time for publicity around the vote. In theory, letting a proposal be open longer for an on-chain vote should improve its ability to meet quorum.
2.2. Commissioning/applying detailed research on the cost-benefit impact of the proposal outcomes. This is similar to the independent economic agencies producing impact analysis. This allows voters to understand assumptions & modelled outcomes in greater detail.
- YFI tokens play a dual role in the eyes of the holders: They have a monetary value in terms of crystallizing rewards, yet they also have value in terms of their ability to perform governance.
This is evident in terms of the impact of time-locking. YFI token holders need to consider if they would like their liquidity to be locked (which may represent an increasing opportunity cost of capital if there is a more profitable opportunity to deploy the locked (& converted) YFI elsewhere).
In the conventional (non-crypto) world, this is solved by the fact that you can’t (legally) sell your vote. You can’t monetize your vote in the short term - and only hope that your vote leads to a better economic outcome for the economy in the long term.
A straightforward example of a solution that I have seen is the one proposed by @cp287
I believe his/her proposal is worthy of debate & consideration.
Taking the above issues & solutions together, there could be a combination of different methods to improve quorum for proposals. For example, I would propose considering a combination of 1 or more of the following:
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Vote only with YFI tokens, not staked yGov.
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Implement a minimum 2-4 week period for any proposal to pass.
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(related to 2 above). Designate an advocate/s for the FOR argument, as well as for the AGAINST argument.
In the private equity space, this is similar to having a devil’s advocate on the investment committee as transactions are evaluated. This helps expand the debate. The advocates’ help generate thinking & debate around their side of the argument that then better informs the entire community. -
Assuming staked yGov remains, then, when counting quorums, exclude smaller staked yGov.
- All votes count.
- But when it comes to quorum counting, exclude smaller staked yGov. E.g. quorum is determined by those above 10,000 BPT. However, this leads to another issue where quorums could pass, with not enough votes cast, simply based on large holders.
Relating to the proposal to expand the time-lock period, I am concerned that it may discourage voting if the entire system remains based on staked yGov (since a lot of staked yGov is chasing yield). If people see the time-locking as an opportunity cost, then I think it may not have the intended impact to improve votes. However, I do like having a longer time-lock period if YFI tokens are applied as the sole voting token.