Hard agree with this.
Let’s focus on one thing at a time. Get this passed, mint 22%, which will last for a long time. Just get this thing over with ASAP!
In the meantime, the team gives a promise that it will not even propose another mint before all of the 22% is exhausted.
Also, at the same time, observe what happens with yfii, whose mint key has been burned, to see in practice whether burning the mint key is beneficial or not for a project.
C’mon guys, just get this over with asap, so everyone can get on with the project development! Everybody will be happy.
Why not just tell us the cashflow you need to not be starving. Golden handcuffs are not the answer. Use a mechanism like juice.work.
BINDING VOTE IS NOW LIVE!
After much discussion and tons of feedback, we decided to keep this proposal mostly as is and leave it to the community to decide.
We added two points of clarification:
We believe it is better to leave the related topics raised here for separate granular discussions. Some contributors agreed, they created a thread to discuss how to handle the minting keys: YFI Mint Controls - Burn the Mint! & Alternatives — any number of proposals may come from this discussion and lead to binding votes.
Thank you all for the extraordinary level of participation.
I don’t like it, so I voted against. It doesn’t even specify what type of vesting we’re talking about. I want it to be for 5 years, equal amounts per year, and this too:
- We should be able to lock the vested funds of any dev. Otherwise they have the option to stop contributing relative to the share of tokens that they would receive in the future. No one should be getting a guaranteed yearly drop. After all, TVL has been going down, especially relative to our competitors, and we’ve missed many big farming opportunities out there. We’ve already been rewarding with salaries for some contributors, a better fee structure for strategists, “Buyback and Build Yearn”, and more.
Once appointed, the working group’s tasks will be to:
- Finalize compensation packages
- Finalize vesting terms
- Identify eligible recipients
- Prepare a Compensation plan for the Multi-sig to review
So the devs now want us to vote on this $200M dilution without any details on the vesting package. What the fuck? What are the vesting details?
Well, we already know that the devs own collectively 500 $YFI, because that’s how many YES votes the proposal received so far.
We don’t want to disclose vesting yet because we haven’t had time to figure it out yet.
We don’t want to make a top-down decision. We need to talk to each member of the team and get their feedback, then look through options in the working group. We will end at a totally reasonable vesting plan. We talked about stuff like 3 or 4 year vesting with a 6 month or 1 year cliff. We considered just adding that, but some on the team wanted to discuss it further. Nothing is going to vest immediately, relax.
Appointed working group decides vesting? Why are the same people who will be getting their compensation/vesting decided on in charge of making these appointments to the working group? Obvious conflict of interest that cannot be ignored. Seems to be no checks/balances here.
You need to put that nothing will vest within 6 months-1 year in the proposal. If you guys have no plans for immediate vesting, this shouldn’t be an issue.
The multisig is empowered as per YIP-41 to make operations decisions like hiring and compensation. Only 2 of the 9 signers are paid by yearn and on the core team. But generally yearn works in a pretty fluid way with the people actually doing the work making the decisions. This is an effective self-management technique used in emerging forms of organization like yearn but a little different than the standard hierarchical stuff we’re most familiar with.
In the case of the compensation working group, I’m leading the effort to assemble it along with the ops team who does the actual work of figuring out compensation stuff for yearn. Like most companies or organizations, we have a team of people who decide compensation. Normally we’d just make these kinds of decisions in the ops team and ask the multisig to approve them (they can veto and not sign).
But since this is a pretty big deal and lots of money, we want help. That’s why we’re doing the working group. We haven’t figured out the exact details for that group, but we’re thinking something like 13 members. Like 3 VCs (experts in compensation design), the 4 people on the ops team who know our team the best and do the compensation work, a couple other team members to get more diverse input, and then 4 community members. Not sure the best way to pick the community members yet. If you have ideas please suggest them.
Once the snapshot vote starts it cannot be changed, so this is the final proposal for voting. If you don’t agree with it you have some options. You can vote no. Or you can also create a counter or related proposal. At yearn the ultimate decider is governance. This is not theater, you really do decide. I’m not sure why anyone would go through the stress of these last weeks if this part didn’t actually matter. But anyway, if you want to set vesting terms do a proposal. Look at the minting keys proposal as an example.
Thanks for explaining. Yeah, I think you guys should’ve included something about no immediate vesting. That was a highly contentious (and simple) point in this thread, and it’s suspiciously convenient that it was left out of the proposal entirely. Why would you guys submit this without clarifying that?
It seems team wants the $70MM now, and questions asked later. Not appropriate when we are talking about $70MM. Needs restriction on vesting for at least 6 months.
That’s why we added the line that all compensation will be subject vesting. That means by definition that there will be no immediate delivery of YFI because “immediate vesting” = “no vesting.” And we make it clear there will be vesting.
Hmmm ok I guess that technically qualifies. Would’ve been better to have a minimum 6-12 months in there but it is what it is. Thanks for clearing that up. I feel a bit better
This seems to be the equivalent of an equity raising round. In these rounds an early-stage venture will issue equity and in effect dilute current shareholders. The reason these work in VC is because the team has more firepower at their disposal to push the project forward. The overarching idea being that the cash raised will increase future value enough to offset any dilution. If all goes well, YFI will melt even MORE faces by minting coins, not fewer.
Some important points:
- YFI tokens are a liquid asset, and as such daily price tends to be top of mind
- We are assuming 1/3 allocation to team improves retention (with vesting)
- Treasury funds should be used in a way that improves the product’s competitiveness and increases longevity, attracting new YFI token buyers
I am supportive of this proposal, assuming raised funds will be allocated effectively going forward. To an extent, this falls on the community to use the treasury wisely in the future.
Let me get this straight…so the request is to approve minting ~$200M, then we’ll figure out the details later? Amazing how back-arsewards crypto has become. To clarify, the way business should work…first, you fully bake the plan, with all relevant details…then you create the proposal. Not getting the fundamentals right, does not inspire confidence in those holding the keys. And comments like “relax”, “we haven’t had time” and “we will end at a totally reasonable vesting plan” are not helpful. You know what is…properly constructing a comprehensive plan in detail for how hundreds of millions will be used, before asking for approval. Don’t trust…verify. Perhaps you might have heard this somewhere before…?
EDIT: The focus has been almost exclusively on making the case for why minting should happen…leaving out many important details and specifics about how the funds will be managed and used. I get it, the team is trying to leave all of its options open…fewer details considered and released means less accountability and obligation to be held to after the fact. But it also means vague transparency, and more room for potential mismanagement.
The minting will happen again.
And developers’ power will be left unchecked eventually.
We can allocate some yfi to developers who will earn from that pool.
If we kept agreeing to mint, it’s the same as what US government did to USD.
And what sort of voting system allows overturning of previous vote??
Check out the discussion on how to handle the minting keys here https://gov.yearn.finance/t/yfi-mint-controls-burn-the-mint-alternatives/
YFI holders have the ultimate authority for minting. Anyone can submit a proposal, and YFI holders vote.
This voting system.
Is there any system in place that enables the community to hold devs/working group accountable for misbehavior/mismanagement of funds?
This system is the ultimate decider controlling protocol and treasury.
YFI holders delegated some decision making power to the multisig in YIP-41 so they have a key role in accountability, but this DAO supersedes.
YFI holders can strip the multisig of powers at any time if they don’t like how things are being managed. They can also decide to restrict funding any person or initiative. Our complete financials are available on-chain and in the quarterly reports (Q4 should be coming soon).
I’m curious if you’ve seen better systems at other DeFi organizations? I believe most of them have more centralized power for managing their teams and less community accountability. Though some fair launched teams like Sushi have as pretty similar system to us.
If anyone can share examples or wants to work on designing or developing better accountability systems I’d love to see it.