Forgive me, but I don’t see where the disincentive to waste ‘voting points’ could possibly come from if the underlying YFI remains necessarily untouched! I thought perhaps ‘voting points’ could be speculated upon like in the way GAS (NEO transaction fuel) is. Then there is a continuously priced asset that one could lose instead of market-selling for guaranteed profits, which maintains the incentive for accumulating ‘voting points’.
To answer your question, if the proposal doesn’t pass, then there could be a mechanism to erase the value you could have gained if you staked in order to receive the potential excess yield designated to those who submit a passing proposal, but at the same time not lose all the yield you could have secured by simply staking YFI as a regular staking participant. So there would be four potential yields: one for simply staking (call it A), one for risking and creating a successful proposal (call it B), one for risking and not creating a successful proposal (call it C), and one for risking and creating a successful and passing proposal (call it D).
This way, D > B > A > C in terms of payout. Maybe all of them should receive some payout?
I would say that a “successful” proposal shouldn’t rely on whether or not it’s passed, but rather should rely on whether or not it was relevant/widely discussed. I guess this begs the question of how to account for potential spamming of fake discussion in governance forums to give off the illusion of “widely discussed”.
Hopefully I wrote this clearly enough to be critiqued, I am not so technically-trained as probably the most of you…